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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

J>Zaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

No. 8561

CI_j YDE ARNOLD WELDON,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ST1-\_TE~IT!JNT

OF TI-IE C1\_SE

This case is before this Court on appeal from a judgment of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Utah, in and for Iron County, finding the
defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit
robbery. The case was tried before the court, a jury hav-..
ing been "\vaived by the defendant.
The information 'vas filed against two defendants,
Robert Clayton Harke and Clyde Arnold Weldon. Prior
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to trial, the court dismissed the actio_ n as against Harke,
hence Weldon is the sole defendant in the case.
On June 6, 1956, the County Attorney of Iron County
filed an amended complaint before a Justice of the Peace
charging the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery.
After a preliminary hearing the defendant was bound
over to the District Court, a jury was waived by the defendant, the case was tried, and the trial court entered
the judgment heretofore noted.
The defendant introduced no evidence in his defense.
The judgment of the trial court finding the defendant
guilty of conspiracy to commit robber~. . 'vas entered notwithstanding(1) Prior to the introduction of any evidence the

District Attorney prosecuting the case stated in
open court that ''there is not a prima facie case
against the defendant. I don't believe there is
a prima facie case * * *" (Tr. 2).
( 2) Prior to the introduction of any evidence he
further stated that '' \\T e haYe no proof of the
overt act going to the conspirac~~, no evidence
that this defendant intended to use the item.''
(7 r. 3 ). (He "~a~ referring- to a gun).
1

(3) \Vht>n the State rested the District .Attorney
stat<:d, ·'About all I \Vould care to say at this

t:imQ i~ that in 1n~· opinion the State has failed
in its duty to prove a prin1a. fncie case. (Tr.
H

:J.'J).
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STATEl\IIENT OF FAGTS
The only evidence introduced by the State was the
testimony of Jack F. Miller, a police officer of Cedar City,
Utah, and Exhibit "A" introduced by the State which
purported to be a "\Vritten confession signed by the defendant.
Officer Miller testified substantially as follows:
That on 1Iay 15th, 1956, shortly after midnight, he
went to the Cedars Hotel in, the co:mtPany of a man named
Robinson; that the defendant and Harke were lying on
the same bed inside a hotel room with the door into the
hallway wide open (Trans. 7-8); that Officer l\Iiller
knocked on the door, and after being given permission,
"\Valked into the room and asked the names of the men,
vvhere they were from, "\Vhat they were doing and if they
\Vould go to the police station. (.Tr. 8).
)

They saw a gun lying on the bed beside Harke and
\V eldon told them that his gun was in his jacket across
the room on the back of a chair. Both guns were loaded.
The officer took possession of the guns. ( T r. 8).
The four men went to the Cedar City police station,
vvhcre the officer talked ,vith \Veldon and Harke together
and then Weldon separately. ( T r. 9).
vVeldon made various admissions {Tr. 10-13) respecting a planned robbery the next morning of Safeway
Store in Cedar City, to "\vhich testimony defendant obSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jected (Tr. 11-14). He signed a confession (Tr. 15 ).
Respecting the confession (Ex. 1) the witness testified
that the man Robinson told the defendant that he didn't
have to sign a statement or confession and that if he did,
it would be voluntary (Tr. 15) and that there were no
promises held out, etc., (Tr. 16), but the -witness was not
in the room at all times. He stated that he was noi present in the room at the police station at the specific times
\vhen the defendant was being questioned by Robinson
and an Officer H9yt; that he had to leave the office to
ans,ver two or three telephone calls, and on another oc(~asion was called out for a short time. (Tr. 18 ).
STATE~IENT

OF ERRORS RELIED

0~

For a reversal of the judgment of the trial court
finding the defendant guilty, the defendant relies on the
following errors of the trial court:
1. The trial court erred in admitting the written and
oral confession of the defendant for the follo\YIng reasons :
(a) The corpus delicti "~as not sufficiently established. Independent of the confession,
there is no p~oof \YhateYer that the defendnut conspired to commit tht:) crime charged,
or any cr1n1E\
(h) The StatP did not proYe the confession \rns

prima fnrie

voluntar~~.

II. F~v-t•n 1hough there had been a plan to com1nit a
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robbery as charged in the information (but no
plan was proved) there was no overt act in
furtherance thereof.
vVhile it may. seem out of order, the appellant believes it will prove-more logical to discuss the points above
raised out of the above ord~r so. that Point I (a) will be
argued first, Point II second, and Point I (b) last.

ARGUMENT
I(a)
The trial court erred in admitting the confession of the defendant because the corpus delicti was not sufficiently established.
Independent of the confession, there is no proof whatever that
the defendant conspired to commit any crime whatever, much
less the crime charged in .the information.

Let us re-examine the proof of the State, deleting
any information supplied by defendants' confession (Ex.
1). A police officer and another man went to a hotel
room, the door to vvhich "\Vas wide open (Tr. 7-8). rrhey
found t'vo men on a bed. A loaded gun 'vas on the bed.
The defendant had a loaded gun in his jacket which was
across the room (Tr. 8). The two men did not object to
and voluntarily accompanied the police officer to the police ·station (Tr. 9 ).
That is the sole independent proof of the commission
of a crime. Defendant has comhed the record to find any
evidence additional to the above. There is none.
'\That crime do those facts show? vVe submit, none
,,,~hateyer.
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There is neither independent proof of any crime nor
the particular crime charged. There is no independent
evidence of any planned robbery, or any plan to rob
Safeway Store, or any plan to rob Robert Childs, individually or as the assistant manager of Safeway Store.
There is not even any evidence that there was such a person as Robert Child, much less that he was the assistant
manager of Safeway Store. There is not even any eYidence that there is a Safeway Store in Cedar City or Iron
tJounty or in the State of Utah. There is absolutely no
evidence of any overt act necessary to constitute the
offense of conspiracy.
It is the ordinary rule of }a,,, adhered to by ihis
Court, that the confession of an accused person is not
sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the offense.
This Court has held to that effect in too many cases
to require argument.
The doctrine enunciated by thi~ Court in State ·r.
Johnson, 95 Utah 37~, 83 Pac. 2d 1010, nt page 101-!, has
since been follo~red, and 'Yc quote pertinent portions:
'' \\r e adhere to the general doctrine that there
must be independent proof of the corpus delicti before the confession can be received for the consideration of the jury * * ~,. The rule 've deduce from
the "'"'(v· it is applied in the over"Thelming majority
of the caRes is that there must be evidence, indepPlHlent of the confesRion, eorroborative thereof,
consistent 1here"·ith, forming a basi~ or foundation
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for the confession, and tending to confirm and
strengihen it, before the confession may be considered by the jury as evidence of guilt. * * * But the
law for reasons which immediately appear has
wisely declared that there must be independent evidence of the first and second points, commonly
called the corpus delicti.''
Defendant contends strenuously that there is not one
scintilla of evidence that defendant conspired to commit
any crime, unless lounging in a hotel room with a loaded
gun can be considered a conspiracy to commit the crime
of robbery.
Follo"\\ring the ,Johnson case is that of State v. Ferry,
~~Utah 2d 371, 275 Pac. 2c1173, 'vhcrein the Court tersely
~aid:

''An accused cannot be convicted on his confession alone. "\Ve believe and hold that in addition there must be independent, clear and convincing evidence of the corpus delicti, although we and
the authorities g·enerally do not require it to be convincing· beyond a reasonable doubt.''

II.
Even though there was a plan to commit robbery as charged
~n the information, the defendant committed no overt act.

The defendant \vas charged under Section 76-12-1, U.
(J . .rl., \Vhich defines criminal conspiracy (so far as pertinent to this case) : "If t\vo or more persons conspire ( 1)
rr. o comm1•t n Cltme.
.·
,,
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Section 76-12-8. provides as follows:
''Act Besides . A.greement Necessary. - No
agreement, except to commit a felony upon the per.
son of another or to commit arson or burglary,
amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act, besides
such agreement, is done to effect the object thereof
by one or more parties to such agreement.''
In short, there must be some qvert act where the defendant is charged with COJ!Spiracy to commit robbery.
Where is the evidence establishing that overt
overt

act~

act~

. What

The closest the State came to proving an

overt act, and we state it at the risk of being repetitious,
was that the defendant and Harke were lounging in a hotel
room with a loaded gun. This falls far short of proving
even an intention to rob the assistant manag·er of Safeway Store, or Safe,vay Store, much less any overt act in
furtherance. Defendant nor anyone else planning a robbery made the slightest move to,vards the store.
''Other than agreements to commit certain felonies which require no oYer arts, an unlawful agreement as defined in Section 103-11-1, U.C ...A.. , 1943,
does not amount to conspiracy according to the
specifications of Section 103-11-3, ~unless some act,
besides sueh agreen1ent, is done to effect the object
thereof by one or n1ore of the parties to agreement.~
Thus, a eri1ninal conspiracy essentially consists of
an unla,vful agreement PljUS SO~IE OVERT ...~CT
OR AC~TS l)ONE TO :F,lTRTIIER OR ACUO~I
l">LISI-I TI-IE ()l~.Jl~CTI\. . E OF STiCH AN
.A. GREE~fEKT. '' Slate ~vs. J.lf.usscr, rf al .. 175 Pae.
~nd 7:24, at. pagP 731, 110 lTtah 5:3+.
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Sections 76-12-1 and 76-12-3, U.C.A., 1953, are identical with Sections 103-.11-1 and 103-11-3, U.C.A.. 1943.
This rule is so overwhelmingly adopted by the Courts
that defendant sees no purpose in citing additional authority, the above case having never been overruled.
I (b)
The trial court erred in admitting the confession of the defendant because the State did not prima facie prove the confession
\Vas voluntary.

The burden of proof is on the State.
~pecting-

The rule re-

the voluntariness of confessions is well stated

in State v. lV ells, 35 Utah 400, 100 Pac. 681, at page 683 :
"\~V e

are therefore of the opinion that, \vhen
evidence of the defendant's confession is offered by
the state, it, on the defendant's objection, must first
introduce some evidence tending to show that the
confession was voluntary; that it is alone "\\t~ithin
the province of the jury to determine, not whether
the confession was or \vas not voluntary, but whether a sufficient prima facie showing, with respect to
its voluntariness, is made to warrant a finding that
it is voluntary; that, before the court rules upon
the question, the privilege should he given the defendant, if he requests it, to cross-examine the \Vitness, or "ritnesses, by \vhom the state seeks to sho\V
the voluntariness of the confession; that when such
Rhowing has been made. and the court determines
that it is prima facie sufficient to authorize such a
finding, then the court should admit the confession * '~ * "
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This Court therefore holds that the State must make
a prima facie showing that the confession is voluntary
and then, as stated by this Court in the Wells case, ''the
privilege should be given the defendant, if he requests it,
to cross-examine the witness or witnesses, by whom the
State seeks to show the voluntariness of the confession
* * *"
But in the case at bar, the \Yitnesses necessaTy to
prove the voluntariness of the confession were not in
court, and so cross-examination was unnecessary. The
defendant did not choose to cross-examine the only witness produced because the State had not made even a
prima facie showing to that point. It is further observed
that the only witness produced might \Yell have been
truthful and still the confession not haYe been voluntarily
made because the witness "\Vas not present during the entire period. This Court will reeall that the ''ritness was
called out of the room on three. or four occasions for varying periods; for how long, the record does not disclose.
During his absence the defendant might \Yell have been
threatened, given false promises or inducements or \vhatnot. The officers remaining in the roon1 "\vere not produced by the State to Inake a prima fncie sho\ving. rrney
\Yere not nYailnble. to be eross-examined.
Trnr, the trinl eourt attc1npted to shift the burden to
t.he de fenf'() by saying:
'' TrrE Counrr: 1\. t tlH) llcfendant ,s requ(_•st the rourt
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will require that those other officers be in attendance before the conclusion of the trial." (Tr. 19 ).

•' MR.

Was the court's statement directed
to the defendant?
CLINE :

''THE CouRT: Yes. In other words, if you desire
to question them as to any circumstances. I assu1ne
this witness and the other officers were present
during the qttestioning or conversation with the defendant. If this witness was not present, if it is
the desire on the part of counsel for the defendant
to question the other 'vi tnesses either on voir dire
-that is, as if they vvere being questioned on voir
dire before the court adm;itted this exhibit, the court
'viii require that they be produced." (Tr. 19 ).
''THE CouRT: It tv as adm.itted on the assumption
that uJe would have the testimony of a witness who
~vas present at all times during the questioning of
the defendant." (Tr.19).
''THE CouRT: "That the court 'vas endeavoring to
get at was, if there is any claim that the statements
by the defendant were not voluntarily made, then
the court should have all the evidence available as
to the voluntariness of this statement, or the statement, the oral statements made by the defendant
b~fore this written statement was signed. If thet·e
is no request for further proof on the part of the
state, that is, to require the state to prove the voluntarincss of this statement or the preceding oral
staten~ents, then the present rttling will stand. I
think tve sh auld ha~:e the other officers present."
(Tr. 19-20).

The trial court assumed that the witness and. the

other officers \\Tere present during the questioning, and
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then indulged in the unique position that he would ass~um.e
the oonfession was voluntary unless the defendant insisted upon the State proving it. In short, the trial court
ruled, in effect, that unless the defendant' indirectly produced the State's 'witnesses, he would assume they would
testify favorably and prove that the confession was voluntary. Defendant does not believe this Court will so
hold.
Further, the con£ ession was admitted ''on the assumption that we would have the testimony of a witness
who was present at all times during the questioning of
the defendant.'' We believe such an assumption unique
in criminal practice. But even so, no such ,,rJ.tness or witnesses were produced, yet the trial court itself attempted
to supply the lack of proof by ruling that unless the defendant requested the State to suppl~v the proof he would
assume it was proved.
As a matter of fact. too, the confession had already
been admitted.
Trne, the court said it 'vould require the attendance
of the other officers ''at the defendant's request'' and
"if you desire to question them'' and "if it is the desire
on the part of counsel to question the other \Yitnesses,"
etr. The eourt also added that if the defendant did not
l'Q<J1lcst thr State to mnke further proof, '·that is, to require the State to prove the Yoluntariness '' the confes~~ ion '''onld h(• admitted.
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Defendant submits that it is not his duty to request
or require. the ·state to prove its case; to demand additional witnesses to be produced by the State or the trial
court to prove the State's case. Defendant submits that
he does not waive any rights by not calling the State's attention to its lack of proof, and that the burden of proof
cannot be shifted because a trial court arbitrarily states
in open court, in effect, "If you don't think the prosecution 4as proved a case, you must make your objection so
additional proof can be submitted, and unless you do demand additional proof I will hold that the proof has been
produced.'' That is not the law and would certainly establish a unique rule or method of procedure.

CONCLUSION
Defendant believes that the District Attorney v;·as
correct and commendably honest and frank in stating in
open court that he could not prove a prima facie case and
at the conclusion of his case further stating that ''the
State has failed in its duty to prove a prima facie case.''
The attitude of this Court is well expressed,
''Our traditional zeal in safeguarding the
rights of an accused person would preclude conviction on such an unsubstantial basis." State v. l?erry,
2 Utah 2d 371, 275 Pac. 2d 173, at page 174.
This case clearly qualifies itself for an order of this
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Court reversing the judgment of the trial court with instructi~ns to grant defendant's motion to dismiss.
Res,pectfully submitted;
CLINE, wILSON & CLINE,

Atto'rneys for Appellant.
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